We face a time of stagnant economic growth, severe unemployment, massive budget deficits, and an increasingly competitive global economy. These daunting challenges are the legacy of a number of unwise policy decisions in both the public and private sectors. While the good news is that unsound policies can be changed, the bad news is that no single step will do the trick. Monetary policy is tapped out, and there is a great deal of uncertainty about the effectiveness of a traditional Keynesian stimulus -and, not surprisingly, a heated debate among economists. One thing we do know is that a stimulus is quite difficult to execute effectively. For example, it is a challenge to identify "shovel ready" projects that contribute to long-term economic growth, particularly on short notice.
There is no uncertainty, though, about the need to address a broad range of specific problems contributing to our economic woes. We have to promote economic growth and fiscal stability over the long-term. To do so, we should reform our housing and mortgage markets, our entitlement programs, our tax code, and much more. A short symposium article cannot delineate all the challenges Congress is facing or provide definitive guidance about how to address them. As an illustrative example, this Article emphasizes the perils of having the highest corporate tax rate in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") in a competitive global economy. Cutting our corporate tax rate will encourage businesses to invest and hire more employees, while also reducing incentives to engage in wasteful tax planning and to shift taxable income and jobs overseas.
In addition to these problems with our substantive law, we also face problems of process that are undercutting our government's effectiveness. An important (and familiar) one is that politicians are consistently tempted to accommodate organized interest groups, especially if the costs of these favors can be quietly passed on to the general public. This is all the more true if special interest deals can be financed with deficit spending, so that the bill will not come due until long after our current political leaders have retired. Various measures can constrain this familiar political dynamic, and this Article sketches three strategies as illustrative examples. First, we should make the costs of special interest deals more visible through better budgetary accounting. Second, we should enlist specific institutions within our government to target waste and pork. For example, we should empower special House and Senate committees to cut particular budget items or, alternatively, to sever them from the rest of the budget and subject them to a separate public vote. Third, we should create stronger institutional barriers to deficit spending. Scarcity focuses the mind, so that our leaders will have greater incentive to reject initiatives that are not cost-justified. the UK, 10.4%; and in Spain, 9.2%. 22 Thirteen member states had government debt ratios of higher than 60% of GDP in 2010. 23 A further fiscal challenge in the United States is the need to meet a broad range of other government obligations, including Social Security and Medicare. These entitlement programs for retirees are funded with taxes on those who are still working. Costs increase with life expectancies and the price of medical care. At the same time, there will be fewer workers to bear this burden as the population ages. 24 As a result, these programs are projected to run massive deficits in the coming years.
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C. Intense International Competition
Meanwhile, another source of pressure on the U.S. economy -and, in particular, on job creation -is global economic competition. The weakening of the dollar has strengthened our exports, but the United States is still running a large trade deficit. 26 Although the economic downturn has been global, some countries have bounced back more quickly. In contrast to the U.S. economy, which grew by 2.9% in 2010, China grew at 10.3%; India grew at 9.7%; Brazil grew at 7.5%; and Mexico grew at 5.5%. 27 It is well understood that we operate in an increasingly global economy, in which the competition for capital and jobs is intense. In recent years, our competitors have reduced the tax burdens on business, adding additional reasons why businesses may prefer to expand in other jurisdictions, instead of in the United States. 28 
D. Promoting Economic Growth
These challenges are enormous, and there are no easy answers. But we should begin with an obvious point: If we could find ways to help our economy grow faster, it would be enormously helpful. A growing economy creates more jobs, generates more tax revenue, and reduces the need for certain types of government services, so that both unemployment and the deficit decline. The problem is that this is easier said than done. A traditional lever for promoting growthmonetary policy -has been essentially exhausted. The Federal Reserve has pushed short-term rates to zero and committed to keeping rates there through 2013.
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At this point, an essential missing ingredient is confidence. Through rigorous costcutting, American businesses have become profitable again and have cash on hand, 30 but so far they are not hiring. "[T]hey simply cannot budget or manage for the uncertainty of fiscal and regulatory policy," said Richard Fisher, the President of the Federal Reserve of Dallas. "In an environment where they are already uncertain of potential growth in demand for their goods and services and have yet to see a significant pickup in top-line revenue, there is palpable angst surrounding the cost of doing business." 31 A crucial challenge is to restore business confidence, so that firms increase their hiring. This will, in turn, enhance consumer purchasing power, which will prompt further hiring, and so on. But how do we induce this virtuous cycle to begin?
II.
Uncertainties and Challenges With A Keynesian Stimulus
A traditional remedy for a stalled economy, dating back to John Maynard Keynes, is for the government to borrow money to purchase goods and services. This sort of fiscal stimulus is meant to increase aggregate demand and, thus, employment. In the winter of 2009, the Obama administration began an $862 billion stimulus. Unfortunately, it underperformed expectations, 32 and economists disagree about why. Some say a stimulus was the wrong medicine, 33 Drawing on this macroeconomic debate, this Part offers four reasons why there is so much uncertainty and why, ultimately, a Keynesian stimulus is so difficult to execute effectively.
A. Dueling Models and Multipliers
First, economists disagree about how much a dollar of deficit-financed government purchases actually contributes to economic growth. Using an "Old Keynsian" model, the Obama administration assumed in 2009 that it would add $1.50 to the economy -a so-called "government purchases multiplier" of 1.5. 36 In contrast, neoclassical models never predict multipliers higher than 1.0, since they assume that interest rates, wages, and prices rise in response to a fiscal stimulus, crowding out private activity. 37 Meanwhile, "New Keynesian" models generally predict multipliers between .6 and 1.0, 38 although they can support multipliers as high as 1.5 during a limited period in which short-term interest rates have fallen to zero.
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Most empirical studies, meanwhile, conclude that government purchases multipliers are below 1.0. For example, according to Barro and Redlick, a dollar increase in U.S. defense spending has contributed only about 70 cents of economic growth. 40 The experience in Japan, which one gets back more than one puts in -or else it's the macroeconomic equivalent of a bloodletting. Obviously, I lean toward the latter position, but I am still hoping for more empirical evidence"). 34 See Second, whatever the purchases multiplier proves to be, it stimulates the economy only if the government actually uses stimulus funds for purchases. As it turns out, though, only a tiny fraction of the 2009 stimulus was used for government purchases. John Cogan and John Taylor show that in 2009 and the first half of 2010, only $18 billion -that is, only 2.1% of the $862 billion program --funded government purchases, with only $2.4 billion supporting infrastructure (0.3%). 42 Much of the money was given to states. While the Administration assumed that 60% of these grants would be used for government purchases, 43 they were used instead to reduce state borrowing -for example, states received $132 billion in stimulus payments and reduced debt levels by $136 billion in the third quarter of 2010 -and also to fund Medicaid and other transfers. 44 Transfers are less likely to stimulate the economy, since they generally are thought to involve lower multipliers. 45 One reason why so little was used for government purchases -and, indeed, why it is so difficult to rely on deficit-financed purchases to stimulate the economy -is that infrastructure projects are slow and difficult to plan. After all, the spending needs to begin (or at least to be announced) quickly, or the stimulus will not be timely. But government-funded infrastructure projects are not famous for their speed.
C. The Problem of Politically-Motivated Projects
Of course, if we rush, the challenge of ensuring that the money is used wisely becomes more daunting. 46 This brings us to the third challenge with a Keynesian stimulus: "[I]t is important to ask whether the spending will produce something society needs . . . ," Gregory Mankiw has observed. "Money spent on a new road that allows farmers to get their products to market faster and in better condition, for instance, creates more value than money spent building temporary rise in government purchases not accompanied by an increase in current distortionary taxes is probably between 0.8 and 1.5"). 41 , available at http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/Cogan%20Taylor%20multiplicand%20Jan%202011%20rev.pdf ("Our main finding is that the increase in government purchases due to the ARRA has been remarkably small, especially when compared with the large size of the ARRA package."). 43 Romer & Bernstein, supra note 32, at 5. 44 John F. Cogan & John B. Taylor, The Obama Stimulus Impact? Zero, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704679204575646603792267296.html. 45 Cogan et al., supra note 38, at 20 (using a coefficient of .3 for the impact of transfers on consumption, which they describe as "likely an upper bound and certainly a generous assumption"). 46 Mankiw, supra note 35 ("rushed spending is, in many important ways, likely to be less efficient and less useful than spending that is carefully planned").
a 'bridge to nowhere,' even if both projects create the same number of construction jobs." 47 Indeed, " [o] ne lesson from Japan is that public works get the best results when they create something useful for the future."
48 For this reason, multipliers are higher when funds are allocated in a process that draws on good information and is insulated from political influence. 49 Although in principle government infrastructure spending can contribute substantially to long-term growth, the process in the 2009 stimulus bill, unfortunately, was not effective at weeding out duds. For example, it allocated $2.6 billion to building a high-speed rail line from Tampa to Orlando. The train would be about 30 minutes faster than driving (54 minutes versus 83 minutes). 50 But mass transit options in both cities are quite limited, so passengers would have to rent a car when they arrive -something that, presumably, would persuade most to drive instead of taking the train. 51 So why fund this project? It could be launched quickly, since the government already owned much the right of way. In addition, Florida is, of course, a politically pivotal swing state. 52 Fortunately, the Governor of Florida pulled the plug on this project, fearing the state would be on the hook for some of the cost overruns.
It is not hard to find other federally funded infrastructure projects that are better explained by politics than economics. The proposed 1.7 mile extension of the San Francisco subway in Chinatown is another example. Because riders will have to go eight stories underground to ride the subway and walk a quarter mile to connect to the Market Street light-rail lines, it will always be five or ten minutes faster to take the bus. 53 Government planning to cover $942 million of the $1.6 billion cost? It is probably not irrelevant that the project is in Nancy Pelosi's district.
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A key challenge with a stimulus, then, is to allocate the funding wisely. The size of the stimulus -though a central question in the recent public debate -is in ways less important than how the money is used. An important risk is that it can be hijacked for pork, and then it will be much less effective at promoting economic growth.
D. The Costs of Deficits
Even if we solve this problem by ensuring that stimulus funds are used only for high value infrastructure projects, we still need a plan to manage the deficit. Although steps to cut the deficit can slow growth in the short term -as occurred in the U.S. in 1937 55 and in the UK in recent months 56 -there is unfortunately a risk that increasing the deficit can also slow growth by undermining consumer and business confidence. 57 Specifically, as the deficit increases, the future tax burdens associated with servicing this debt grow as well. If businesses and consumers focus on these future tax burdens, they may spend less today, as David Ricardo observed over a century ago. 58 Of course, it is impossible to forecast exactly who will bear tax burdens, especially if the political process has not allocated them yet, and Ricardo himself recognized that people are not always this farsighted. 59 But those who run businesses -and are deciding whether to hire another person -constantly have to make predictions about the future. Their "most likely reaction," according to Richard Fisher, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, "is to cross your arms, plant your feet and say: 'Show me. I am not going to hire new workers or build a new plant until I have been shown" how the deficit will be addressed. 60 The plan needs to be "sufficiently specific and widely supported," the Director of the Congressional Budget Office has testified, "so that households, businesses, state and local governments, and participants in the financial markets believ[e] that the future fiscal restraint w[ill] truly take effect." 61 In essence, we have to focus on short-term recovery and long-term deficit reduction at the same time, and this is not an easy balance to 54 57 See Elmendorf, supra note 9, at 5 ("credible steps to narrow budget deficits over the longer term would tend to boost output and employment in the next few years by holding down interest rates and by reducing uncertainty and enhancing business and consumer confidence"). 58 See DAVID RICARDO, Essay on the Funding System, in THE WORKS OF DAVID RICARDO WITH A NOTICE OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF THE AUTHOR BY J. R. MCCULLOCH 115 (1888) ("In point of economy there is no real difference in either of the modes, for 20 millions in one payment, 1 million per annum forever, or £1,200,000 for forty-five years are precisely of the same value.") For a more modern formulation of "Ricardian equivalence," see Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? 82 J. POLIT. ECON. 1095 ECON. (1974 . 59 RICARDO, supra note 58 ("But the people who paid the taxes never so estimate them, and therefore do not manage their private affairs accordingly. We are too apt to think that the war is burdensome only in proportion to what we are at the moment called to pay for it in taxes, without reflecting on the probable duration of such taxes."). 60 Fisher, supra note 31. 61 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at 5. strike. 62 It is like navigating between Scylla and Charybdis, and it is hard to be confident that we will chart exactly the right course.
If we allow the deficit to grow unchecked, though, we face the familiar long-term costs of growing deficits. 63 Higher long-term interest rates can crowd out private investment (although long-term rates are quite low now). Likewise, the government may be tempted to use inflation to reduce the real value of the debt. 64 We are also burdening future generations, and constraining the government's capacity to pursue other initiatives, going forward.
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The bottom line, then, is that there is a great deal of uncertainty about the effectiveness of a Keynesian stimulus. Much depends on how the money is used and on how we propose to pay for the stimulus over the long-term. One thing we can say with confidence is that a Keynesian stimulus is hard to do well. For all these reasons, it is unlikely to serve as a magic bullet for reviving our economy.
III. Tackling Problems of Substantive Law: The Example of Cutting Corporate Tax Rates
A. Addressing a Broad Range of Problems
At the same time, we know that there are a broad range of problems that need to be addressed. Since consumers with underwater mortgages have less purchasing power, we should explore ways to help them refinance. 66 Unwise lending helped to precipitate this crisis, and better financial regulation is needed, going forward. Social security and Medicare have sizable projected deficits, so we need to reform these systems to ensure their solvency. We should eliminate unnecessary regulatory burdens so businesses will expand. Obviously, there are many more examples as well.
As we look for legal regimes to modify in order to encourage economic growth, we have ample reason to focus on the tax code. It is overly complex, so that compliance and enforcement are costly and special interest deals are harder to see. Poorly crafted tax rules obviously can undermine incentives to work and invest. A growing body of empirical research shows that 62 Bernanke, supra note 10 (asserting the importance of pursuing "the two goals of achieving fiscal sustainabilitywhich is the result of responsible policies set in place for the longer term-and avoiding the creation of fiscal headwinds for the current recovery" and arguing that the two goals are "not incompatible"). 63 
B. The Case Study of Corporate Tax Reform
Of the many ways we could reform our tax system to promote economic growth, cutting the corporate tax rate should be high on our list, and so this reform is offered as an illustrative example here. There are three reasons for this.
First, by reducing the tax on business income, we increase the after-tax return when businesses invest and hire more people. This incentive effect was hard to document in early studies measuring tax rates over time, since it was difficult to disentangle changes in tax rates from other changes in the economy. 69 But more recent empirical studies, focusing on microeconomic and cross-sectional data, offer strong evidence that lower taxes lead to more (and higher quality) investment. 70 Similarly, reducing the tax burden on business increases their cash flow, which helps them expand and add workers.
71 "A consensus has emerged that investment tendency for a number of aggregate variables to move together over the business cycle makes it difficult to isolate effects of individual fundamentals on investment using time series data"). 71 Carroll et al., supra note 70, at 427 ("taxes exert a statistically and quantitatively significant influence on the probability that an entrepreneur invests. For example, a five-percentage-point rise in marginal tax rates would demand is sensitive to taxation," Kevin Hassett and Glenn Hubbard have observed, "and neoclassical investment models are useful for policy analysis." 72 Experts from both political parties have contributed to this literature, including Austan Goolsbee and Christina Romer, who were senior economic advisors to President Obama. 73 Second, lower tax rates also reduce the incentive to engage in distortive tax planning. There is less reason to favor debt over equity, to prefer tax-free reorganizations to taxable ones, to remain a private company (and thus to stay eligible for pass-through tax treatment), to favor some types of investments or sectors over others, and the like. The corporate tax, in particular, prompts a great deal of distortions and wasteful planning. 74 The "virtually unanimous view among economists and other tax policy analysts," Michael Graetz has observed, "[is] that the corporate tax is a bad tax, if the goal is to enhance our nation's economic wellbeing." 75 Third, cutting the corporate tax rate is all the more important in a competitive global economy. This year, our corporate tax rate has become the highest in the OECD, now that Japan has cut its rate. 76 Our 35% rate is significantly above the median OECD rates of 24% (Israel) and 25% (Austria). 77 By comparison, China's rate is 25% (with a reduced 15% rate for high tech firms), the UK's rate is 26%, Italy's is 27.5%, Korea's is 22%, Turkey's is 20%, and Ireland's is 12.5%. 78 Given the mobility of capital -and, thus, of jobs -we ignore our competitors' tax rates at our peril. There is strong empirical evidence that high tax rates discourage foreign direct reduce the proportion of entrepreneurs who make new capital investments by 10.4 percent. Further, such a tax increase would lower mean capital outlays by 9.9 percent"). 72 Hassett & Hubbard, supra note 69, at 1338. 73 See Goolsbee, supra note 70, at 519 ("[T]ax policy toward investment, by changing the relative prices of capital varieties even within narrow classes of equipment, can have a direct effect on the quality composition of capital goods that firms purchase. Detailed data on farming, mining, and construction machinery suggest that this impact is economically important."); Romer & Romer, supra note 67, at 764 ("The most striking finding . . . is that tax increases have a large negative effect on investment"). 74 Slemrod ed., 2000) . But since corporate profits are taxed twice -once at the corporate level and again when the profits are paid as a dividend -corporate rates have to be considerably lower than individual rates before this strategy becomes attractive. For example, if the corporate rate is reduced to 25%, and dividends continue to be taxed at 15% , the nominal effective rate here is 37% (i.e., 25%, plus another 15% of the remaining 75%, or 12%), which is still higher than the 35% maximum rate currently in effect for individuals. 75 79 High U.S. marginal rates also create an incentive for U.S. businesses to shift taxable income overseas -and with it our tax base and, in some cases, real economic activity and jobs. 80 U.S. national welfare is likely to suffer when startups incorporate overseas to avoid U.S. tax on offshore income, when a tech company holds intellectual property overseas so that royalty payments to offshore affiliates can reduce its U.S. taxable income, and when manufacturing companies and financial firms move facilities and jobs to lower tax jurisdictions. 81 All of these steps would be less tempting to businesses if U.S. marginal corporate tax rates were lower.
The main problem with cutting the corporate tax rate is political. Unsophisticated voters might think this was an unfair sop to the rich. But the reality is that the corporate tax is borne not only by wealthy investors, but also by less wealthy ones (e.g., the beneficiaries of pension funds) as well as by consumers (through higher prices for the corporation's products) and labor (through reduced wages). There is no consensus about how the corporate tax burden actually is allocated -that is, about what the tax's economic incidence is. 82 Recent research suggests, though, that labor's share of the corporate tax burden has been growing, given the increasingly competitive global market. 83 If cutting the tax rate leads to more hiring in the United States -as it should, for all the reasons discussed above -the distributional benefit of this tax cut will be quite broad. In any event, we can pair a corporate tax cut with other measures, such as an extension of unemployment insurance, to attain whatever overall distribution we are seeking for the tax and transfer system as a whole.
A further challenge in cutting the corporate tax rate is how to make up the lost revenue. The corporate tax collected $278 billion in 2010, representing 11% of I.R.S. collections.
84 Some revenue will be recovered automatically when the rate cut reduces taxpayer incentives to engage in tax planning. At the margin, some will replace debt with equity (since the interest deduction will be less valuable) -which is likely to be a socially valuable change in and of itself 85 -some will become less aggressive about shifting income to other countries (as the spread between the rates in the U.S. and other jurisdictions narrows), and the like. We have only limited data about the magnitude of this planning -and, thus, the revenue we would recover in stopping it -but a great deal of money is likely to be at stake. 86 To recover additional revenue, we can broaden the corporate tax base in other ways as well. For example, current law includes a number of targeted benefits for particular activity, such as special deductions for domestic manufacturing. 87 To the extent that these preferences breed inefficiency by treating various industries and assets differently, repealing them is likely to be good policy anyway. 88 More generally, in deciding what preferences to eliminate, we should prioritize ones that are better explained by politics than economics, while preserving provisions that are especially effective at promoting investment and economic growth. 89 We can choose to 84 The study also argues that growth would be slowed somewhat by a rate reduction that is revenue neutral, since attaining revenue neutrality would require repeal of investment incentives that are economically valuable. In coming to this conclusion, the study assumes that rate reductions offer less economic growth per dollar of lost revenue -in effect, less "bang for the buck" -than these investment incentives. The theory is that investment incentives offer more "bang for the buck" because they reduce the tax burden only on new investment, while rate reductions also reduce the tax burden on investments that are already in place. The study assumes that this benefit to old capital is wasteful, since the relevant investment decision has already been made. But this conclusion is naïve in a world of mobile capital flows; even "old" capital is in play, since firms might decide to move it offshore (or, relatedly, to implement planning strategies that shift the taxable income it generates to a different jurisdiction). As a result, low rates contribute to economic growth not only by inspiring new investment, but also by allowing us to keep old investment within the United States. Once this added benefit of rate reductions is taken into account, the argument limit the rate cut to a level that can be funded through repeal of uneconomic preferences, or we can decide to cut the rate even more and make up the revenue in other ways. Obviously, important details need to be worked out here, and my goal is not to resolve them all, but to offer an example of the type of growth-enhancing-tax reform that should be high on our agenda.
IV. Tackling Problems of Process: Promoting Better Fiscal Decisionmaking
Just as we need to reform our tax system and a host of other regimes of substantive law, we also should improve our budgetary processes. In a time of austerity, we have to be more rigorous about priorities and more efficient in pursuing them. 90 Whether we are implementing a new stimulus or seeking to reduce our deficit, public spending should focus on high-value projects, not pork. Our tax system should promote growth with low rates and a broad base. Budgets should balance the value of the goods and services we are buying against the cost of the taxes (and borrowing) needed to fund them. These recommendations are as uncontroversial --even bland -as advocating baseball and apple pie on the Fourth of July. But unfortunately, few would argue that we are already attaining these goals and, in my view, we aren't even close.
A. Problems of Information and Political Incentives
The dynamics holding us back are familiar as well. Some challenges involve information. In deciding what projects to pursue and how to pursue them, the government often has limited information and faces significant uncertainty. It is often hard to predict how taxpayers will respond to a change in the tax law, whether a particular infrastructure investment will come in under budget or, for that matter, what it will take to win a war.
In my view, the incentive problems are even more serious because of two familiar failings of our political marketplace. First, political leaders know that pleasing organized interest groups helps attract campaign contributions and votes, especially if the cost of special interest legislation can be passed on to everyone else in a way that will not attract attention.
91 After all, the American people will not notice if you take a penny from each of them every day in order to please some interest group; in a nation of 300 million people, that is over $1 billion dollars per year. Instead of fighting over which interest groups to please, it is easier for congressional leaders to let all legislators offer pet projects to their friends. 92 Second, politicians have the incentive to focus more on the short-term -on today's polls and the next election --than on the long-term health of the nation. As a result, interest-group log-rolling is even harder to resist when financed with deficit spending. This way, the cost can be paid far in the future -when our current political leaders will have retired and when the taxes that investment incentives offer more "bang for the buck" -and thus that a revenue neutral rate reduction would not increase GDP -becomes much less persuasive. 90 See Elmendorf, supra note 9, at 8 ("The nation cannot continue to sustain the spending programs and policies of the past with the tax revenues it has been accustomed to paying. Citizens will either have to pay more for their government, accept less in government services and benefits, or both"). 91 will be paid by people who aren't even born yet. 93 It is tempting to use the same dynamic to resolve (or, really, to avoid having to resolve) policy differences, while letting everyone "bring home the bacon" to their constituents. Instead of choosing between lower taxes and more spending, why not do both? Not surprisingly, studies show that divided governments are more likely to run deficits 94 and that deficits are less likely to be cut during election years. 95 Unfortunately, these incentive and information problems reinforce each other. Political leaders often justify special interest legislation with half-baked policy claims, which may seem more plausible when uncertainties are great and information is limited.
B. Institutional Strategies to Promote Better Fiscal Decisions
We need to keep these challenges in mind not just when we make policy decisions, but also when we decide how to make policy decisions. Can we change the process in ways that will create better political incentives? Obviously, this is challenging because political leaders have reason to like things as they are. They might be willing to support changes that seem to improve the process -so that they can take credit -but they will be tempted to include loopholes that allow them to keep playing the same old games. 96 Even so, it is worth understanding what steps should be taken to improve fiscal decisionmaking. In a rare moment when the public is focused on these issues -as they seem increasingly to be now -something constructive can be done. How can we better align the incentives of public decisionmakers with the interests of the public as a whole? There is no magic bullet -and, indeed, more to say than can be covered in a brief Article -but it is worth outlining three strategies, involving disclosure, institutional mechanisms targeting waste and pork, and enforced scarcity. benefit analysis for new appropriations and changes in the tax law, as well as estimates of how the costs and benefits are distributed. Are the benefits of a particular initiative concentrated narrowly among a small group of people? Or in a particular geographic area? Do the costs fall disproportionately on future generations? 99 Individual members, the media, academics, lobbyists, and advocacy groups can (and do) also help disinfect our budget with sunlight by focusing attention on matters that the government has itself disclosed and, of course, by generating new information. 100 Senator William Proxmire's Golden Fleece Awards publicized unwise expenditures, and Representative Paul Ryan has followed in this tradition with his Budget Boondogle Awards. 101 In an era of social media, private wikis and other websites funded with tax deductible contributions can also serve as fiscal watchdogs.
102 A program analogous to qui tam awards can also be implemented to incentivize them further. The risk that special interest deals will be exposed and "go viral" on the web should exert some discipline on Congress.
Institutional Reform
Second, in addition to relying on better accounting and disclosure, we should create internal barriers to wasteful appropriations, tax loopholes, and the like. The ban on earmarks was a productive step, as was the creation of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction in the Budget Control Act of 2011.
Building on the latter model, we should task particular institutions within the government to root out waste and pork, so that they will seek professional glory in resisting the specialinterest dynamics described above. 103 These institutions obviously would have to be willing to Budget Windows, Sunsets and Fiscal Control 2 (NBER, Working Paper No. 10694, 2004) ("a budget window that is too short permits the shifting of costs beyond the window's endpoint. But a budget window that is too long includes future years for which current legislation is essentially meaningless, and gives credit to fiscal burdens shifted to those whom the budget rules are supposed to protect"). 99 SHAVIRO, supra note 25, at 103. 100 While the focus here is on disclosure about outputs from the budget process, a different question is how much disclosure about the process itself is optimal. As Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermuele have observed, this information can promote "bad" as well as "good" accountability; through the former, interest groups seek to verify that legislators are serving their interests. displease particular interest groups. Their political incentive could be to respond to the growing anti-deficit sentiment within the voting public, or to claim credit for finding savings that spare us from tax increases or from cutting more important programs.
We can assign these "de-appropriations" institutions a range of different missions, depending upon how powerful we want them to be. At a minimum, their findings should be publicly disclosed, along with the names of those who sponsored and supported these suspect initiatives. Even better, bipartisan standing House and Senate Committees could be empowered to sever items from the budget, so that these provisions would be subjected to a separate (public) vote. 104 Going even further, we could give a congressional committee the functional equivalent of a "line-item" veto, such that it could kill items it does not consider cost-justified. 105 The mere possibility that pork could be cut in this way would itself discourage some log-rolling ex ante, since parties to a trade couldn't be sure their side of the bargain would survive.
An even broader mandate would be for this new committee to identify a designated percentage of the budget every year that they consider least valuable, much like some companies have an annual process for identifying and replacing their least productive employees. The executive branch's Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") could engage in a parallel exercise. If implemented effectively, this would be an extremely important achievement. As Edward Lazear has observed, a one percent reduction in government spending each year, in real terms, would bring our budget into balance in about eight years. 106 How much would we really miss the least useful one percent of the budget if we were able to identify and eliminate it each year?
For this sort of unpopular mission, we also can rely on independent commissions to make recommendations and, of course, to deflect blame from elected officials. 107 Management consultants perform a comparable function for CEOs, distancing senior management from steps that are unpopular but necessary. Similarly, the process used for closing military bases after the meaningless, allowing states to engage in accounting gimmicks to give the false illusion of fiscal discipline, to channel their deficits into separate accounts (e.g., for pensions or capital) that are not subject to the constraint, or to devolve functions to localities in order to move costs off of the state's budget. 115 Likewise, a constraint on spending would also be ineffective if the legislature could avoid it by recasting a program as a targeted tax break. 116 Yet as a number of empirical studies have shown, well crafted state constraints do, in fact, make a difference. 117 For example, states that require supermajorities to raise taxes are less likely to do so, 118 and are more likely to have taxes that are broad-based. 119 Alternatively, some states have limits on taxes and expenditures ("TEL's"). TEL's are more effective if they cap spending increases based on population growth and inflation (as opposed to growth in personal income), if they require immediate refunds of surpluses, if they adjust the spending limit if governmental functions are taken off budget, 120 and if they measure whether the budget actually was balanced as of the end of the year (instead of merely whether a balanced budget was projected when the year began). 121 TEL's of this type generally slow state spending growth by a meaningful amount each year. 122 We should draw on this wealth of experience to develop effective budgetary reforms for Congress, such as a new and improved version of PAYGO, while keeping in mind that the experience of states and the federal government are not perfectly analogous. For example, the federal government can print money, while states cannot; at the same time, states do not have the same level of responsibility (e.g., for national defense), and usually can depend on help from the federal government in an emergency. In a sense, states are inherently more constrained than the federal government, and have less need of flexibility anyway.
In any federal regime of this sort, then, we need some flexibility for emergencies, without opening the floodgates. Obviously, it is easier to preserve flexibility -and to act quickly -with statutory rules than constitutional ones. We can allow the deficit to increase if, for instance, a supermajority of legislators believe this is necessary in response to a particular crisis (hopefully, for merits-based reasons and not because swing votes have been secured with pork). Likewise, we should exempt the defense budget during significant armed conflicts, while cabining this exception with rules policing what counts as defense expenditures (e.g., so we exclude high speed commuter rails that incidentally benefit the defense industry).
Likewise, we need a mechanism for determining the budget if the process deadlocks. As a default, we can rely on the proposals of standing committees that target waste, as discussed above, along with a mix of automatic across-the-board spending cuts, government salary and hiring freezes, automatic tax increases, and the like. The threat of these automatic cuts will serve as a "hammer," motivating Congress to negotiate a package of smarter ones.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the various recommendations here reinforce each other. For example, a constraint on deficits such as PAYGO requires tough accounting rules to keep Congress from evading it. 123 If successful, a PAYGO rule will motivate a "deappropriations" committee to cut waste and pork -and will induce the rest of Congress to accept its work -as a way to preserve resources for higher priorities.
V. Conclusion
Inefficiency in our tax system and in government spending obviously is never a good idea, but it is especially undesirable when times are tight. We cannot afford to waste money or miss opportunities to promote economic growth. With one-sixth of our workforce unemployed or underemployed, with a soaring budget deficit, and with global economic competition intensifying in every sector, we must not settle for flawed fiscal policies. Our corporate tax system is urgently in need of reform. Reducing the rate and broadening the base would contribute significantly to economic growth. This should be an important first step in a broader effort to improve our tax system. In addition, we should not settle for a budgetary process that wastes public money on pork and shies away from making difficult decisions. We can do much better, and now is the time to start.
